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STRENGTHENING SANCTIONS:
SOLUTIONS TO CURTAIL THE EVASION OF 
INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC SANCTIONS 
THROUGH THE USE OF CRYPTOCURRENCY
Emma K. Macfarlane*
I.  INTRODUCTION
In March 2020, Chinese nationals Tian Yinyin and Li Jiadong were 
charged with laundering over $100 million in cryptocurrency.
1
The source of 
the funds? A state-sponsored North Korean malicious cyber group.
2
The 
process that Tian and Li followed to launder the funds was strikingly simple. 
First, Tian and Li received the stolen cryptocurrency from North Korean 
hackers.
3
They then transferred the digital assets among various cryptocur-
rency addresses, muddying the origins of the funds.
4
This allowed Tian and 
Li to transfer the cryptocurrency into Chinese bank accounts and exchange 
the cryptocurrency for prepaid Apple iTunes gift cards.
5
This simple process 
allowed a small group of state-sponsored actors to evade heavy United Na-
tions sanctions levied against North Korea.
6
* J.D. Candidate, University of Michigan Law School (2021); B.A., McGill Universi-
ty (2016). My sincere thanks to Samuel Grone for his invaluable edits on this note and support 
over the past three years. Thank you also to the editing team of the Michigan Journal of Inter-
national Law, both for your thoughtful suggestions and friendship. Finally, thank you to Karin 
Thrasher for sharing her extensive insights into this topic throughout the editing process.
1. Spencer S. Hsu & Ellen Nakashima, Two Chinese Nationals Indicted in Cryptocur-




2. Chinese Remitters Tian Yinyin, Li Jiadong Charged with Laundering US$100m 
Cryptocurrency, STANDARD (Mar. 3, 2020), https://www.thestandard.com.hk/breaking-news
/section/6/143035/Chinese-remitters-Tian-Yinyin,-Li-Jiadong-charged-with-laundering-
US$100m-cryptocurrency; Treasury Sanctions Individuals Laundering Cryptocurrency for 




5. Id.; Aruna Viswanatha, Ian Talley & Dustin Volz, Two Chinese Nationals Indicted 
in Alleged North Korean Bitcoin Hack, WALL ST. J. (Mar. 2, 2020), https://www.wsj.com
/articles/two-chinese-nationals-indicted-in-alleged-north-korean-bitcoin-hack-11583170682.
6. United Nations member states are prohibited from directly or indirectly supplying, 
selling, or transferring to North Korea funds or assets that would be used to support their nu-
clear weapons program. See S.C. Res. 1718, ¶ 8 (Oct. 14, 2006). The North Korean state-
sponsored entities which transferred the funds to Tian and Li have in the past been linked to 
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The actions of Tian and Li are the tip of the iceberg. A UN report notes 
that low levels of governmental oversight in the cryptocurrency sector have 
enabled North Korea to generate income at an alarming rate.
7
As of July 
2019, an estimated $2 billion had been raised through the evasion of finan-
cial sanctions using cryptocurrencies.
8





have also dabbled in the use of cryptocurren-
cies to evade international sanctions. The efficacy of financial sanctions is in 
this way consistently undermined through illicit transfers of cryptocurren-
cy.
11
As the cryptocurrency sector exceeds forty-two million users world-
wide,
12
it begs the question: If cryptocurrency is left unregulated in the in-
ternational sphere, will financial sanctions have any power at all?
This note posits that an international regulatory framework is necessary 
to combat the evasion of financial sanctions.
13
It further argues that the best 
way to structure this new framework is through the enactment of a new mul-
tilateral treaty. Section II provides an overview of the innerworkings of 
cryptocurrencies and the state of cryptocurrency regulation today. Section 
III details the inadequacy of the current patchwork regulation of cryptocur-
rency and focuses on how cryptocurrencies aid in the evasion of financial 
sanctions. It concludes that an international regulatory framework is neces-
sary to curtail bad actors’ evasion of sanctions through cryptocurrency. Sec-
hacks of other cryptocurrency exchanges to raise funds in support of North Korea’s nuclear 
program. The transfer of funds to Tian and Li were linked to these same reported hacks. In 
other words, the United Nations suspected these funds would also be used to generate revenue 
for North Korea’s nuclear weapon program. See  Hsu & Nakashima, supra note 1.
7. Rep. of the S.C., at 4/142, U.N. Doc. S/2019/691 (2019).
8. These proceeds are used for the country’s weapons of mass destruction programs. 
Id.
9. Russian officials conceded that a primary motivation for the creation of a “cryp-
torouble” (a new type of cryptocurrency) was to “settle accounts with [Russia’s] counterpar-
ties all over the world with no regard for sanctions.” CONG. RSCH. SERV., IF10825, DIGITAL 
CURRENCIES: SANCTIONS EVASION RISKS 2 (Feb. 8, 2018).
10. Venezuela attempted to make its own cryptocurrency in 2017. President Nicolas 
Maduro explicitly defended Venezuela’s efforts as a way to circumvent the financial “block-
ade” created by the U.S. government. Alexandra Ulmer & Deisy Buitrago, Enter the ‘Petro’: 




12. Lubomir Tassev, The Number of Cryptocurrency Wallets is Growing Exponentially,
BITCOIN.COM (Sept. 26, 2019), https://news.bitcoin.com/the-number-of-cryptocurrency-
wallets-is-growing-exponentially/.
13. Financial sanctions are the “withdrawal of customary trade and financial relations 
for foreign- and security-policy purposes.”  They are typically levied by states and suprana-
tional bodies such as the United Nations and European Union; targets of sanctions can range 
from entire countries, to organized groups, to individuals. Jonathan Masters, What are Eco-
nomic Sanctions?, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS (Aug. 12, 2019), https://www.cfr.org
/backgrounder/what-are-economic-sanctions.
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tion IV proposes a new multilateral framework for the regulation of crypto-
currency. It further details why this is the best option for curtailing the eva-
sion of financial sanctions through the use of cryptocurrencies.
II. UNDERSTANDING CRYPTOCURRENCIES AND 
CRYPTOCURRENCY REGULATION
A.  The Rise of Cryptocurrency
The use of cryptocurrency has revolutionized international commerce.
14
The first digital currency, Bitcoin, was developed in 2009.
15
As of 2019, an 
estimated forty-two million users have access to over 2000 digital curren-
cies.
16
The astronomic rise in the popularity of cryptocurrencies may be ex-
plained by two key properties.
17
First, digital currencies are typically decen-
tralized.
18
Practically, this means that transactions can be completed without 
the use of intermediaries such as banks.
19
Decentralization is attractive be-
cause, as one commentator opines, it removes the intermediaries who “tell 
us what to do, tell us what to think, and charge us for the privilege as they 
gatekeep the juiciest intersections of our economies.”
20
Second, cryptocurrencies are mostly “pseudo-anonymous.”
21
To under-
stand the extent of this anonymity, one must first understand an aspect of 
blockchain technology that underlies all cryptocurrencies. This technology 
is called “public key cryptography.” Public key cryptography is a crypto-
14. Ilker Koksal, The Rise of Crypto as Payment Currency, FORBES (Aug. 23, 
2019, 10:28 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/ilkerkoksal/2019/08/23/the-rise-of-crypto-as-
payment-currency/#42d0901b26e9.
15. Chris McCann, 12 Graphs That Show Just How Early the Cryptocurrency Market 
Is, MEDIUM (May 7, 2018), https://medium.com/@mccannatron/12-graphs-that-show-just-
how-early-the-cryptocurrency-market-is-653a4b8b2720.
16. Reiff, supra note 13.
17. Note here the distinction between digital currencies and cryptocurrencies. Digital 
currencies are the “overall superset” that includes cryptocurrencies. Some digital currencies—
such as Central Bank Digital Currencies (“CBDCs”)—have the potential for mass centraliza-
tion. Because cryptocurrencies rely on cryptography (unlike, for example CBDCs), this leads 
to greater inherent decentralization. For more on this, see Tommaso Mancini-Griffoli, Marla 
Soledad Martinez Peira, Itai Agur, Anil Ari, John Kiff, Adina Popescu & Celine Rochon, Cast-
ing Light on Central Bank Digital Currencies, INT’L MONETARY FUND (Nov. 12, 2018).
18. Id. New cryptocurrencies that have a centralized framework (such as Libra) are not 
included within this analysis.
19. Id.; BANK FOR INT’L SETTLEMENTS, CENTRAL BANK DIGITAL CURRENCIES 6 (Mar. 
2018).
20. Clem Chambers, Decentralized Cryptocurrencies are the Future, FORBES (Sept. 6, 
2018), https://www.forbes.com/sites/investor/2018/09/06/decentralized-cryptocurrencies-are-
the-future/#731549f235b1.
21. Dong He, Karl Habermeier, Ross Leckow, Vikram Haksar, Yasmin Almeida, Mikari 
Kashima, Nadim Kyriakos-Saad, Hiroko Oura, Tashin Saadi Sedik, Natalia Stetsenko & Con-
cepcion Verdugo-Yepes, Virtual Currencies and Beyond: Initial Considerations 9 (Jan. 2016).
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graphic system that uses a pair of digital keys.
22
Each cryptocurrency user 
has two keys.
23
One is a public key, and one is private.
24
The private key is a 
randomly generated hexadecimal number.
25
As the name suggests, the user 
must keep their private key private at all times.
26
Public keys are another 
hexadecimal number; they are derived from (and have a mathematical rela-
tionship to) the private key.
27
A user need not keep their public key private.
28
A simple illustration helps demonstrate how public and private keys fa-
cilitate anonymity in cryptocurrency transactions.
29
Imagine that Sally wants 
to sell Jake her lawnmower. Jake will pay Sally using Bitcoins encrypted by 
public key cryptography. Because Sally and Jake are both Bitcoin users, 
they each have one public key and one private key. Jake sends Bitcoins to 
Sally. It is best to think of these Bitcoins as being transferred within a small 
(digital) box. Jake “locks” (encrypts) the box using Sally’s public key. When 
Sally receives the box, she “unlocks” (decrypts) it using her own private 
key. This works because Sally’s public and private keys are mathematically 
related.
One component of this illustration is crucial to understand the nature of 
cryptocurrency: the identities of Sally and Jake are themselves obscured to 
third-parties. The only identifiable information within the transaction to oth-
er users—Sally’s public key—is itself mathematically scrambled into a 
number referred to as a “hash.”
30
In this way, users in cryptocurrency trans-
actions may retain a high level of anonymity.
31
The transaction that other us-
ers can see, then, is informationally equivalent to: User A is sending fifteen 
coins to User X.
22. Id. at 10, fn. 8.
23. See id.
24. See id.
25. See DELOITTE, A MARKET OVERVIEW OF CUSTODY FOR DIGITAL ASSETS 6 (June 
2020).
26. Public and Private Keys, BLOCKCHAIN.COM (Mar. 29, 2020), https://support.
blockchain.com/hc/en-us/articles/360000951966-Public-and-private-keys.
27. What is Public-Key Cryptography?, GLOB. SIGN (2020), https://www.global
sign.com/en/ssl-information-center/what-is-public-key-cryptography.
28. Id.
29. For an in-depth and accessible explanation of the workings of public key cryptog-
raphy, see Surveillance Defense, SURVEILLANCE SELF-DEFENSE (Nov. 29, 2018), 
https://ssd.eff.org/en/module/deep-dive-end-end-encryption-how-do-public-key-encryption-
systems-work.
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B. The Regulation of Cryptocurrency
The proliferation of cryptocurrency has raised the need for cross-border 
regulation.
32
The overall cryptocurrency market size is projected to reach 
$1.4 billion USD by 2024;
33
this is complemented by the increasing willing-
ness of certain countries to move toward cashless economies.
34
Moreover, 
not only has the number of cryptocurrency users grown, but also the nature 
of cryptocurrency transactions has evolved. Cryptocurrencies are not only 





and for buying goods such as Lamborghinis on the luxury 
marketplace.
37
Cryptocurrencies are also used for illicit activities. The transactional 
anonymity that comes alongside the use of cryptocurrencies like Bitcoin at-
tracts users who engage in a host of illegal behaviors.
38
Bitcoin is frequently 
32. Ralph Auer & Stijn Claessens, Regulating Cryptocurrencies: Assessing Market Re-
actions, BIS QUARTERLY REV. (Sept. 23, 2018), https://www.bis.org/publ/qtrpdf/r_
qt1809f.htm; Ana Alexandre, New Study Reveals Countries with Most Registered Crypto Ex-
changes, COINTELEGRAPH (Sept. 11, 2019), https://cointelegraph.com/news/new-study-
reveals-countries-with-most-registered-crypto-exchanges (“In 2018, the total volume of 
bitcoin directly transferred between exchanges was almost $92.6 billion. A total of $65.1 bil-
lion was transferred by exchanges from G20 countries, Hong Kong, and Singapore.”).
33. Cryptocurrency Market by Offering, MARKETS & MARKETS (Feb. 28, 2020), 
https://www.marketsandmarkets.com/Market-Reports/cryptocurrency-market-
158061641.html.
34. Elena Perez, Crypto vs. Cash: Which Countries Expect to Go Digital Soon?,
COINTELEGRAPH (Aug. 12, 2019), https://cointelegraph.com/news/crypto-vs-cash-which-
countries-expect-to-go-digital-soon (noting, for example, that Sweden uses cash for only 2% 
of payment transactions and that by 2030 “it is expected that only 10% of the money spent in 
Canada will be completed with cash transactions.”); see also Ryan Browne, People in Sweden 
Barely Use Cash – and That’s Sounding Alarm Bells for the Country’s Central Bank, CNBC 
(May 3, 2018), https://www.cnbc.com/2018/05/03/sweden-cashless-future-sounds-alarm-
bells-for-the-central-bank.html.
35. See Justin O’Connell, Venture Capital’s View of DeFi, FORBES (March 5, 2020).
36. Roger Huang, Cryptocurrency Is Strengthened By Space Exploration, FORBES
(June 29, 2020), https://www.forbes.com/sites/rogerhuang/2020/06/29/cryptocurrency-is-
strengthened-by-space-exploration/#5ac493143c5b.
37. Ali Montag, This Cryptomillionaire Bought a Lamborghini for $115 Thanks to 
Bitcoin, CNBC (Feb. 7, 2018), https://www.cnbc.com/2018/02/07/bitcoin-millionaires-are-
buying-lamborghinis-with-cryptocurrency.html.
38. As of 2018, close to one-half of bitcoin transactions were associated with illegal 
activity. Further, “the estimated 24 million bitcoin market participants that use bitcoin primari-
ly for illegal purposes (as at April 2017) annually conduct around 36 million transactions, with 
a value of around $72 billion, and collectively hold around $8 billion worth of bitcoin.” Sean 
Foley, Jonathan R. Karlsen & T lis J. Putninš, Sex, Drugs, and Bitcoin: How Much Illegal Ac-
tivity is Financed Through Cryptocurrencies?, UNIV. OF OXFORD BUS. L. (Feb. 19, 2018), 
https://www.law.ox.ac.uk/business-law-blog/blog/2018/02/sex-drugs-and-bitcoin-how-much-
illegal-activity-financed-through; Emanuele Borgonovo, Stefano Caselli, Alessandra Cillo, 
Donato Masciandaro & Giovanno Rabitti, Cryptocurrencies, Central Bank Digital Cash, Tra-
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Cryptocurrencies today are regulated sporadically on a nation-by-nation 
basis.
44
It is striking that despite the ubiquity of cryptocurrency the world 
over,
45
no international uniform regulatory system exists. Cryptocurrency is 
anomalous in this respect. In our globalized society, international organiza-
tions have gone to great lengths to regulate activities with high cross-border 
implications. The flight of aircrafts,
46







are all regulated through the 
ditional Money: Does Privacy Matter?, 7 (Ctr. Applied Rsch. on Int’l Mkts, Banking, Fin. & 
Reg., Working Paper N. 95, 2018)
39. Cynthia Dion-Schwarz, David Manheim & Patrick B. Johnston, Terrorist Use of 
Cryptocurrencies, RAND CORP. ix (2019), https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand
/pubs/research_reports/RR3000/RR3026/RAND_RR3026.pdf.
40. See, e.g., Mike Orcutt, Criminals Laundered $2.8 Billion in 2019 Using Crypto Ex-
changes, Finds a New Analysis, MIT TECH. REV. (Jan. 16, 2020), https://www.technology
review.com/f/615064/cryptocurrency-money-laundering-exchanges/.
41. See, e.g., Foley et. al., supra note 38.
42. Id.
43. Investor Alert: Bitcoin and Other Virtual Currency-Related Investments, SEC.
EXCH. COMM’N (May 7, 2014), https://www.sec.gov/oiea/investor-alerts-bulletins
/investoralertsia_bitcoin.html; Adam Barone, The Future of Cryptocurrency in 2019 and Be-
yond, INVESTOPEDIA (June 25, 2019), https://www.investopedia.com/articles/forex/091013
/future-cryptocurrency.asp. Although Bitcoin is often the target of public ire for illegal behav-
iors—likely due at least in part to its public visibility and popularity—other cryptocurrencies 
such as Ethereum, Ripple, and Litecoin have the same potential for the illegitimate uses men-
tioned here. See, e.g., Joseph Young, Why a Mysterious Ethereum User Paid $2.6 Million to 
Send $130 of Crypto, FORBES (June 10, 2020), https://www.forbes.com/sites/youngjoseph
/2020/06/10/why-a-mysterious-crypto-user-paid-26-million-to-send-merely-130-in-ethereum
/#79c73993588a; Gertrude Chavez-Dreyfuss, Roughly $400 Million of Ripple Tokens Tied to 
Illegal Activity: Elliptic, U.S. NEWS (Nov. 20, 2019), https://www.usnews.com/news
/technology/articles/2019-11-20/roughly-400-million-of-ripple-tokens-tied-to-illegal-activity-
elliptic; Rakesh Sharma, Litecoin Gains Ground on Bitcoin in the Dark Web, INVESTOPEDIA
(June 25, 2019), https://www.investopedia.com/news/litecoin-gains-ground-bitcoin-dark-web/.
44. See Global Legal Research Center, Regulation of Cryptocurrency Around the World,
L. LIBR. CONG. 8–9 (June 2018), https://www.loc.gov/law/help/cryptocurrency/crypto
currency-world-survey.pdf.
45. See Helen Partz, 19% of World Population Bought Crypto Before 2019: Kaspersky 
Report, COINTELEGRAPH (June 21,2019), https://cointelegraph.com/news/19-of-world-
population-bought-crypto-before-2019-kaspersky-report.
46. See Convention on International Civil Aviation, Dec. 7 1944, 15 U.N.T.S 295.
47. See General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh 
Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1A, 1867 U.N.T.S. 187, 33 
I.L.M 1153 (1994) [hereinafter GATT 1994].
48. See, e.g., James Chen, Basel Accord, INVESTOPEDIA (July 22, 2019) 
https://www.investopedia.com/terms/b/basel_accord.asp.
49. See Hans W. Micklitz, International Regulation on Health, Safety and the Environ-
ment - Trends and Challenges, J. OF CONSUMER POL. 23 (Mar. 2000).
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force of international agreements. Commentators believe that the regulation 
of cryptocurrency is within reach.
50
However, there is scant agreement on a 
framework or method of implementation that would function as an effective 
international regulatory solution.
51
III. THE PROBLEMATIC ABSENCE OF INTERNATIONAL REGULATIONS 
FOR CRYPTOCURRENCIES
State-by-state regulation of cryptocurrencies has problematic implica-
tions for cross-border investigations and predictability in application. More-
over, this regulatory framework leaves open opportunities for actors world-
wide to violate international sanctions with impunity. Section III.A details 
the upswing in enforcement efforts as well as the lack of a formal, uniform 
mechanism to regulate cryptocurrency. It also explores the unwelcome con-
sequences that come hand-in-hand with a dearth of international regulation. 
Section III.B details how cryptocurrencies are used to evade international 
sanctions and explains why the lack of overarching regulation is especially 
problematic in the sanctions context. Finally, Section III.C identifies both 
the conceptual and ethical problems associated with a scarcity of interna-
tional cryptocurrency regulation.
A.  Repercussions of Declining to Regulate Cryptocurrency on an 
International Level
Cryptocurrencies cannot be effectively regulated by a patchwork of 
laws which vary from nation to nation. Two problems arise without an inter-
national regulatory framework. First, the interaction of national laws results 
in a framework that is both over- and under-inclusive for investigations and 
prosecutions. Second, enforcement mechanisms are unpredictable. This 
scares away institutional investment in cryptocurrency and inhibits the de-
velopment of cryptocurrency in areas that matter most, such as emerging 
economies.
50. Kate Rooney, Your Guide to Cryptocurrency Regulations Around the World and 
Where They Are Headed, CNBC: MARKETS (March 27, 2018, 6:00 AM), 
https://www.cnbc.com/2018/03/27/a-complete-guide-to-cyprocurrency-regulations-around-
the-world.html.
51. Compare Ed Howden, The Crypto-Currency Conundrum: Regulating an Uncertain 
Future, EMORY INT’L L. REV. 742 (2015) (arguing that regulatory bodies must undertake the 
regulation of all cryptocurrencies), with Hossein Nabilou, How to Regulate Bitcoin? Decen-
tralized Regulation for a Decentralized Cryptocurrency, INT’L J. OF L. & INFO. TECH. 266
(2019) (arguing that cryptocurrencies such as bitcoin cannot be regulated in a centralized fash-
ion because of their decentralized structure, and that regulation must occur at their code or 
protocol layer).
206 Michigan Journal of International Law [Vol. 42:199
1.  Over- and Under-Inclusivity
A nation-by-nation legal framework has the two-pronged weakness of 
being both over- and under-inclusive. The framework is underinclusive be-
cause it allows those using cryptocurrency for illicit purposes to slip through 
the cracks and remain untouched by any country’s law. Consider, for in-
stance, those users who intend to exploit cryptocurrency for the purpose of 
tax evasion.
52
In August 2019, the Portugal Tax Authority announced that 
neither cryptocurrency trading nor payments made through the use of cryp-
tocurrency would be taxed within the country.
53
Conversely, Sweden applies 
a capital gains tax of thirty percent to all forms of cryptocurrency, taking the 
view that digital coins are assets rather than cash.
54
These radically differing 
policies combined with the “default privacy features” that define digital as-
sets have effectively made cryptocurrency “the new Swiss bank account”:
55
Without an overarching regulatory authority, there is little to prevent a Swe-
dish coin holder from storing, trading, and profiting from cryptocurrency 
held in Portugal, all without paying the taxes mandated by Swedish law.
56
A
mechanism is needed to identify those actors that seek to evade their coun-
tries’ taxes. Without international coordination, this remains near impossi-
ble.
57
Legal inconsistencies from nation to nation also results in the potential 
for over-inclusive regulation. The paucity of supranational regulation invites 
a high likelihood of overlapping liability. This risks the violation of the 
52. See António Madeira, No Tax for You: Why Crypto Traders and Miners Might Head 
to Portugal, COINTELEGRAPH (Mar. 28, 2020), https://cointelegraph.com/news/no-tax-for-you-
why-crypto-traders-and-miners-might-head-to-portugal.
53. Kelly Phillips Erb, Portugal Tax Authorities Clarify That Buying or Selling Crypto-
currency is Tax-Free, FORBES (Sept. 19, 2019), https://www.forbes.com/sites/kellyphillipserb
/2019/09/19/portugal-tax-authorities-clarify-that-buying-or-selling-cryptocurrency-is-tax-free
/#3fa72b9277e3.
54. Blockpit.io, How are Cryptocurrencies Regulated in Sweden?, MEDIUM
(Nov. 18, 2019), https://medium.com/the-capital/how-are-cryptocurrencies-regulated-in-
sweden-8beffcce80fa.
55. Kieran Smith, How Crypto Could Bring Tax Evasion to the Masses, ONEZERO (July 
18, 2019), https://onezero.medium.com/how-crypto-could-bring-tax-evasion-to-the-masses-
bb4060766147.
56. As a counterpoint to this which demonstrates the importance of an overarching reg-
ulatory body, consider countries typically classified as “tax havens.” Although there is not a 
comprehensively defined standard for the classification of a tax haven country, there are sever-
al regulatory bodies that monitor those countries that may qualify as tax havens. These organi-
zations, such as the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (“OECD”), act 
as intergovernmental mediators so as to stimulate economic progress and world trade. See
Julia Kagan, Tax Haven, INVESTOPEDIA (Aug. 8, 2019), https://www.investopedia.com
/terms/t/taxhaven.asp. See also Who We Are, OECD (2020), https://www.oecd.org/about/.
57. Convention for the Avoidance of Double Taxation and the Prevention of Fiscal Eva-
sion with Respect to Taxes on Income, U.S.-Austl., art. 1, Aug. 6, 1982, 35 U.S.T. 1999.
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common law concept of double jeopardy
58
and its civil law counterpart ne 
bis in idem (“not twice in the same thing”).59 Let us use Hamas, a militant 
Palestinian group, and their cryptocurrency fundraising campaigns as an il-
lustration.
60
Hamas is regarded as a terrorist organization by the European 
Court of Justice.
61
Transfers of funds to Hamas are prohibited by countries 
within the European Union and the United States.
62
Hypothesize a case in 
which a Spanish citizen transfers digital coins to an agent of Hamas located 
in Texas. Both the United States and Spain wish to prosecute; each country 
has jurisdiction over the perpetrator in question; both states have different 
laws which apply to “the same common nucleus of operative facts.”
63
With-
out the aid of international regulations to guide questions of jurisdiction re-
garding illicit cryptocurrency transfers, a high risk of “carbon copy prosecu-
tions” emerges.
64
Carbon copy prosecutions refer to duplicative prosecutions brought in 
different foreign jurisdictions for the same conduct.
65
Countries have a sub-
stantial incentive to vindicate their own laws at the best of times.
66
With re-
spect to Bitcoin transactions, of which an estimated forty-six percent in-
58. Double Jeopardy, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014) (defining double 
jeopardy as “[t]he fact of being prosecuted or sentenced twice for substantially the same of-
fense.”); see also U.S. CONST. amend. V. (stating that “[N]or shall any person be subject for 
the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb . . . .”).
59. Robin Geiss, Ne Bis In Idem, OXFORD PUB. INT’L L. (July 2013) (defining ne bis in 
idem as “. . . the principle that nobody should be judged twice for the same offence.”).
60. Nathaniel Popper, Terrorists Turn to Bitcoin for Funding, and They’re Learning 
Fast, NY TIMES (Aug. 18, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/08/18/technology/terrorists-
bitcoin.html; Jason Brett, Israel Counter-Terrorism Institute Reports Hamas Using Bitcoin as 
A Funding Source, FORBES (Jan. 21, 2020), https://www.forbes.com/sites/jasonbrett
/2020/01/21/israeli-counter-terrorism-institute-reports-hamas-using-bitcoin-as-a-funding-
source/#4bc5a73d4994.
61. Lizzie Dearden, Hamas Declared a Terrorist Organisation by the European Court 
of Justice, INDEPENDENT (July 26, 2017), https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world
/europe/hamas-terrorist-organisation-ecj-european-court-of-justice-eu-uk-palestinian-israel-
a7860301.html.
62. Id.; Max Greenwood, US Adds Hamas Leader to Terror Blacklist, Imposes Sanc-
tions, HILL (Jan. 31, 2018), https://thehill.com/policy/international/371657-us-adds-hamas-
leader-to-terror-blacklist-imposes-sanctions.
63. This is a fixture of redundant or “carbon copy” prosecutions. Andrew S. Boutros & 
T. Markus Funk, “Carbon Copy” Prosecutions: A Growing Anticorruption Phenomenon in a 
Shrinking World, U. CHI. LEGAL F. 259, 269 (2012) [hereinafter “Carbon Copy” Prosecu-
tions].
64. Id.
65. See Andrew S. Boutros & T. Markus Funk, The Evolution and Status of ‘Carbon 
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volve illicit goods, this interest is particularly salient.
67
Carbon copy prose-
cutions typically apply to enforcement actions brought under the Foreign 
Corrupt Practices Act,
68
but there is reason to believe that they may be used 
more broadly within the context of cryptocurrency. Just as a number of na-
tions have passed “enhanced” anti-corruption laws,
69
so too is the trend with 
respect to national laws regulating the use of digital currencies.
70
Over the 
past four years, an upswing in legal regulations of digital currencies has 
been accompanied by an increase in laws providing for enhanced extraterri-
torial application.
71
This closely mimics the legal landscape which allowed 
for redundant prosecutions of foreign bribery to proliferate.
72
2.  Unpredictability
There exists a second unwelcome consequence of nation-by-nation reg-
ulation. Without a homogeneous approach to the regulation of cryptocurren-
cy, laws and enforcement mechanisms are unpredictable.
73
The implications 
of this are twofold.
First, regulatory uncertainty is keeping institutional investors out of the 
cryptocurrency marketplace.
74
Without consistent, clear guidance on how 
cryptocurrencies are treated in cross-border transactions, institutional inves-
tors will likely remain sidelined from the market.
75
Cryptocurrencies need 
67. Foley et. al., supra note 38, at 1798 (“. . . around $76 billion of illegal activity per 
year involves bitcoin (46% of bitcoin transactions), which is close to the scale of the U.S. and 
European markets for illegal drugs.”).
68. See generally Richard L. Cassin, ‘Carbon Copy Prosecutions’ Change the Rules of 
the Game, FCPA BLOG (Nov. 9, 2012), https://fcpablog.com/2012/11/09/carbon-copy-
prosecutions-change-the-rules-of-the-game/.
69. “Carbon Copy” Prosecutions, supra note 63, at 270.
70. See Global Legal Research Center, supra note 44, at 1 (“This report covers 130 
countries as well as some regional organizations that have issued laws or policies on the sub-
ject. The past four years have seen cryptocurrencies become ubiquitous, prompting more na-
tional and regional authorities to grapple with their regulation.”).
71. See id. at 1–2.
72. “Carbon Copy” Prosecutions, supra note 63, at 271.
73. See generally Douglas J. Cumming, Sofia Johan & Anshum Pant, Regulation of the 
Crypto-Economy: Managing Risks, Challenges, and Regulatory Uncertainty, J. RISK & FIN.
MGMT (July 2019).
74. See id.; Danny Nelson, More than Half of Financial Advisors Want Better Regula-
tion Before Investing in Crypto, COINDESK (Jan. 14, 2020), https://www.coindesk.com/more-
than-half-of-financial-advisors-want-better-regulation-before-investing-in-crypto; see also 
Rachel Wolfson, Self-Regulatory Advancements to Crypto Market Will Spark Interest From 
Institutional Investors, FORBES (Aug. 13, 2018), https://www.forbes.com/sites/rachelwolfson
/2018/08/13/self-regulatory-advancements-to-crypto-market-will-spark-interest-from-
institutional-investors/.
75. See Stephen J. Obie & Mark W. Rasmussen, How Regulation Could Help Crypto-
currencies Grow, HARVARD BUS. REV. (July 2018), https://hbr.org/2018/07/how-regulation-
could-help-cryptocurrencies-grow; see also Michael Liftik, Dave Grable & Heather Christen-
son, The Pitfalls of SEC’s Crypto Regulation by Enforcement, LAW360 (Jan. 10, 2020), 
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institutional investors because a market that rests solely on retail investors is 
subject to extreme volatility.
76
International regulations that promote the 
predictability of enforcement mechanisms would have the effect of stabiliz-
ing the cryptocurrency market by appeasing institutional investors’ fear of 
“regulation by enforcement.”
77
Second, the reticence of institutional investors to invest in cryptocurren-
cy has an outsized effect on emerging economies. Cryptocurrency is an effi-
cient method to bring financial inclusion and financial sector development 
to developing countries.
78
The lack of brick-and-mortar banks in large 
swaths of sub-Saharan Africa is a problem that experts believe might be re-
solved with the advent of mobile money services such as cryptocurrency.
79
Further, citizens in countries with corrupt or unstable governments may find 
relief through investment in digital assets.
80
Populations in developing coun-
tries who miss out on these unrealized benefits are those who need them the 
most. The international regulation of cryptocurrency would act as a step to-
ward encouraging institutional investment in digital coin technology without 
the underlying fear of violating a patchwork of incompatible national laws.
https://www.law360.com/articles/1231846/the-pitfalls-of-sec-s-crypto-regulation-by-
enforcement.
76. See Liam Kelly, Regulatory Uncertainty Keeps Institutional Money Sidelined,
CRYPTO BRIEFING (Dec. 5, 2019), https://cryptobriefing.com/regulatory-uncertainty-
institutional-money/.
77. Liftik, Grable & Christenson, supra note 75.
78. Financial inclusion means that, “individuals and businesses have access to useful 
and affordable financial products and services that meet their needs – transactions, payments, 
savings, credit and insurance – delivered in a responsible and sustainable way.” Financial In-
clusion Overview, WORLD BANK (Oct. 2, 2018), https://www.worldbank.org/en/topic
/financialinclusion/overview. See also Olusegun Vincent & Olaniyi Evans, Can Cryptocurren-
cy, Mobile Phones, and Internet Herald Sustainable Financial Sector Development in Emerg-
ing Markets?, J. OF TRANSNAT’L MGMT. 259, 270 (2019). Note that internet access is a neces-
sary component of cryptocurrency and this poses more of a difficulty in developing than 
developed countries. But as mobile connectivity becomes increasingly widespread within 
emerging economies, this problem will slowly dissipate.
79. Jean-Phillippe Stijns, Banking in Sub-Saharn Africa: Interim Report on Digital Fi-
nancial Inclusion, EUR. INV. BANK 1 (2017) https://www.eib.org/attachments/efs/economic_
report_banking_africa_interim_2017_en.pdf. Note that other financial instruments such as 
MPESA have also made great strides in improving financial access and inclusion in develop-
ing countries. See Kieron Monks, M-Pesa: Kenya’s Mobile Money Success Story Turns 10,




80. See Pavithra Rao, Africa Could Be the Next Frontier for Cryptocurrency, U.N.:
AFR. RENEWAL (Apr. 2018), https://www.un.org/africarenewal/magazine/april-2018-july-2018
/africa-could-be-next-frontier-cryptocurrency.
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B. Cryptocurrencies and the Evasion of International 
Financial Sanctions
The evasion of international financial sanctions through the use of cryp-
tocurrency is a well-documented phenomenon and perhaps one of the most 
problematic practices facilitated by cryptocurrencies.
81
There are a number 
of actors who take advantage of cryptocurrency to evade international finan-
cial sanctions. Chief among these are countries themselves. Iran,
82
Russia, 
Venezuela, and North Korea have each turned to different forms of crypto-
currency as a method of skirting around harsh financial sanctions leveled 
against them by the United States and United Nations.
83
The second tranche 
of users who employ cryptocurrencies as a method of sanctions evasion are 
commercial businesses and individuals.
84
There are two features which con-
tribute to users’ capabilities in the realm of sanctions evasion, both of which 
might be solved by international regulation.
85
1.  Pseudo-Anonymity
First, cryptocurrencies have an inherently high degree of anonymity.
86
This is well illustrated by the inner workings of Bitcoin. Each Bitcoin user’s 
public key is scrambled to produce a public Bitcoin address.
87
The public 
may see who sends and receives transactions, because both users’ Bitcoin 
addresses are made public in the course of these transactions.
88
The public 
may also see the amount of cryptocurrency transferred within the transac-
81. See, e.g., HM Treasury, Digital Currencies: Response to the Call for Information 
11-12 (2015) [hereinafter HM Treasury Report]; Deane R. Konowicz, The New Game: Cryp-
tocurrency Challenges US Economic Sanctions, (Feb. 8, 2018) (unpublished Ph.D. disserta-
tion, U.S. Navy War College) (on file with the Defense Technical Information Center).
82. Jason Brett, Trend Continues for Countries Looking to Evade U.S. Sanctions Using 
Crypto, FORBES (Jan. 29, 2020), https://www.forbes.com/sites/jasonbrett/2020/01/29/trend-
continues-for-countries-looking-to-evade-us-sanctions-using-crypto/#4f20e5a159ff; Anthony 
Cuthbertson, Sanction, INDEPENDENT (Aug. 29, 2018), https://www.independent.co.uk/life-
style/gadgets-and-tech/news/iran-national-cryptocurrency-us-sanctions-bitcoin-trump-
a8512596.html.
83. See Ian Munroe, Venezuela, Russia Aim to Dodge Sanctions with Cryptocurrency 
but Experts Aren’t Buying It, CBC NEWS (Jan. 14, 2018), https://www.cbc.ca
/news/world/cryptocurrency-bitcoin-russia-venezuela-sanctions-1.4477323.
84. See, e.g., Thomas Erdbrink, How Bitcoin Could Help Iran Undermine U.S. Sanc-
tions, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 29, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/01/29/world
/middleeast/bitcoin-iran-sanctions.html.
85. See infra Part IV.
86. HM Treasury, supra note 81, at 12; see also Monetarists Anonymous; Bitcoin,
ECONOMIST (Sept. 29, 2012).
87. Felten, supra note 30.
88. See Is Bitcoin Anonymous?, BITCOIN MAG. (2020), https://bitcoinmagazine.com
/guides/bitcoin-anonymous.
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tion.
89
However, that is where the identification ends: The Bitcoin addresses 
do not include any information that personally identifies the individuals on 
either end of the transaction.
90
This results in what the industry refers to as 
“pseudo-anonymity.”
91
In practice, this anonymity has permitted businesses 
in sanctioned countries to exploit Bitcoin and other cryptocurrencies to 
evade financial sanctions.
92
2.  Third-Party Intermediaries
Second, there are limited third-party authorities with the capabilities to 
freeze, cancel or reverse digital currency payments.
93
Further, those that do
exist are unlikely to exercise their powers to monitor digital exchanges.
94
Fi-
nancial intermediaries profit off of their users’ cryptocurrency transactions.
95
To halt any exchange is to disrupt the intermediaries’ flow of income. This is 
underscored by the intermediaries’ customer agreements which absolve 
them of liability for any manipulative market activities.
96
In the context of 
financial sanction evasions, this is problematic for two reasons. First, even if 
an intermediary is cognizant of an illicit exchange of digital currency, the 
incentives to halt the exchange are minimal. Second, financial intermediar-
ies may be incentivized to cater to users located in sanctioned countries. In 
part because of U.S. sanctions, Iran has become a hotspot for Bitcoin;
97
in-
termediaries have capitalized on this trend by matching buyers in Iran to 
sellers in countries around the world.
98
89. Id.
90. See Bitcoin Transactions Aren’t as Anonymous as Everyone Hoped, MIT TECH.
REV. (Aug. 23, 2017), https://www.technologyreview.com/s/608716/bitcoin-transactions-
arent-as-anonymous-as-everyone-hoped/.
91. See id.
92. Erdbrink, supra note 84.
93. HM Treasury, supra note 81, at 12.
94. Kelly Funderburk, Regulating Cryptocurrency, REGULATORY REV. (July 31, 2019), 
https://www.theregreview.org/2019/07/31/funderburk-regulating-cryptocurrency/.
95. Id.
96. Timothy Massad, It’s Time to Strengthen the Regulation of Crypto-Assets,
BROOKINGS UNIV. 21 (Mar. 2019).
97. See Bradley Keoun, Bitcoin as a Safe Haven? US-Iran Tensions Rekindle Debate,
COINDESK (Jan. 6, 2020, 9:19 PM), https://www.coindesk.com/bitcoin-as-a-safe-haven-us-
iran-tensions-rekindle-debate.
98. Billy Bambrough, Iran Sanctions: People Are Turning to Bitcoin to Get Money Out,
FORBES (May 10, 2018), https://www.forbes.com/sites/billybambrough/2018/05/10/iran-
sanctions-people-are-turning-to-bitcoin-to-get-money-out/#2beb7e50613a.
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C. Curtailing the Evasion of Financial Sanctions through 
Cryptocurrency: A Practical and Theoretical Analysis
1.  The Doctrine of Clean Hands
As a matter of legal theory, curtailing the evasion of financial sanctions 
through cryptocurrency may be justified through the concept of “clean 
hands.” In this analysis, the doctrine of clean hands is interpreted through 
both an ethical and legal lens; the moral doctrine informs the application of 
its legal counterpart.
First, the ethical theory of clean hands implies that states have a moral 
obligation to cease trading with bad actors within the international sphere.
99
Under this ethical doctrine, the objective of economic sanctions is to do 
more than change the offending state’s behavior or punish the state for its 
transgressions. Instead, the focus is turned inward. The aim of economic 
sanctions is to avoid complicity with the targeted state’s unlawful actions.
100
The same analysis may be extended to the evasion of financial sanctions. 
When bad actors evade sanctions, the international community assumes an 
obligation to quash this bad behavior or otherwise risk complicity.
This analysis dovetails with the legal doctrine of clean hands in interna-
tional law. The legal principle of clean hands states that an actor who has 
violated equitable norms “may be deprived of the necessary locus standi in 
judicio for complaining of corresponding illegalities on the part of other 
States.”
101
An evaluation follows as to how this compels an international 
regulatory framework for cryptocurrency.
One manifestation of the clean hands doctrine within customary inter-
national law is the principle of nullus commodum capere de sua injuria pro-
pria (“no advantage may be gained from one’s wrong”).102 The wrong in this 
instance is the failure to regulate cryptocurrency or regulation in a manner 
that is wholly inadequate. This constitutes a wrong because the absence of 
regulation is a catalyst for the evasion of international sanctions.
103
As in-
99. For an in-depth discussion of this philosophical argument, see Noam J. Zohar, Boy-
cott, Crime, and Sin: Ethical and Talmudic Responses to Injustice Abroad, CAMBRIDGE UNIV.
PRESS 39 (2012).
100. Id. at 46, 52.
101. Rahim Moloo, A Comment on the Clean Hands Doctrine in International Law,
GIBSON, DUNN & CRUTCHER 39 (2013). Locus standi in judicio refers to “the right to bring an 
action, to be heard in court, or to address the Court on a matter before it.” Locus Standi Law 
and Legal Definition, U.S. LEGAL (2019).
102. Ori Pomson & Yonatan Horowitz, Humanitarian Intervention and the Clean Hands 
Doctrine in International Law, ISRAEL L. REV. 219, 231 (2015).
103. An obligation exists under customary international law to enforce international 
sanctions. States must apply all signed treaties in good faith, and to violate one’s obligation of 
good faith is to violate customary international law. The requirement of good faith means that 
a party may not avoid an obligation under an agreement by a literal interpretation of a clause. 
See Draft Articles on the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties with Commentaries, 
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formed by the ethical theory of clean hands, failing to combat the evasion of 
sanctions is a moral wrong.
All states that fail to combat the evasion of sanctions profit from this 
wrong. The effective regulation of cryptocurrency is an expensive, bureau-
cratic, and time-consuming endeavor.
104
Thus, states gain an advantage (by 
freeing obligated state resources) from their wrong (declining to effectively 
regulate cryptocurrencies in a manner that curtails the evasion of sanctions). 
From this analytical exercise, it follows that states are violating the legal 
clean hands doctrine. As such, states risk their judicial standing should they 
wish to litigate an issue arising from the evasion of sanctions through cryp-
tocurrency.
2.  Just War Theory
The two conceptual analyses of “clean hands” obligations are under-
pinned by the assumption that economic sanctions are themselves legally 
and ethically justified. A theoretical counterpoint to the clean hands argu-
ments may therefore be raised by attacking the legality of economic sanc-
tions themselves.
105
Commentators have leveled this critique through the 
lens of just war theory,
106
which justifies acts of aggression only under cer-
tain conditions.
107
A core tenet of just war theory is the requirement of pro-
portionality.
108
Legal theorists have derided economic sanctions as dispro-
portional and thereby in violation of the proportionality principle.
109
If one 
accepts this argument as true, then the theoretical justifications underpin-
ning responses to the evasion of economic sanctions falls apart. Any re-
sponse to evasions of sanctions is not justified if the sanctions themselves 
were illegal from the outset.
This argument falls short upon examination of the methods by which in-
ternational sanctions are implemented. When a multi-state body such as the 
United Nations institutes economic sanctions against a state, it undergoes a 
A/CONF. 39/11 Add. 2, 30-31 (1969) (comment on principle of pacta sunt servanda); see also 
J. Curtis Henderson, Legality of Economic Sanctions Under International Law: The Case of 
Nicaragua, WASH. & LEE L. REV. 167, 190 (1986).
104. See Regulation of Cryptocurrency: Switzerland, LIB. OF CONG. (July 24, 2020), 
https://www.loc.gov/law/help/cryptocurrency/switzerland.php.
105. See, e.g., MARK R. AMSTUTZ, INTERNATIONAL ETHICS: CONCEPTS, THEORIES AND 
CASES IN GLOBAL POLITICS (4th ed. 2016); Lori Fisler Damrosch, The Collective Enforcement 
of International Norms Through Economic Sanctions, ETHICS & INT’L AFF. 7 (1999); Joy 
Gordon, Economic Sanctions, Just War Doctrine, and the “Fearful Spectacle of the Civilian 
Dead”, CROSSCURRENTS 387 (1999).
106. See Elizabeth Ellis, The Ethics of Economic Sanctions, 2013) (unpublished Ph.D. 
thesis, The University of Edinburgh) (on file with The University of Edinburgh).
107. James T. Johnson, Just War, ENCYCLOPAEDIA BRITTANICA,
https://www.britannica.com/topic/just-war (last visited Oct. 5, 2020).
108. Ellis, supra note 106, at 75–76.
109. See, e.g., Gordon, supra note 105, at 389.
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complex series of legal and diplomatic processes which culminate in a vote 
taken by the UN Security Council.
110
Fifteen states vote on the sanctions in 
each instance, nine of which must vote in favor for any sanction to take ef-
fect.
111
Adjustments to sanctions are then informed by monitoring groups, 
smaller teams, and various panels that support the work of sanctions com-
mittees.
112
Sanctions under the authority of the European Union are subject 
to a similar process.
113
These supranational bodies would be hard-pressed to 
enact a more thorough process without risking outsized bureaucratic en-
cumbrances before and during the implementation of the sanctions. In this 
way, these international conglomerates satisfy the just war proportionality 
requirement.
114
3.  Practical Implications
Curtailing the evasion of financial sanctions through cryptocurrency is 
imperative. First, to do without regulation allows unstable regimes to raise 
money they would not have otherwise had access to. A prime example is 
that of Kim Jong-un’s government in North Korea.
115
North Korea is cur-
rently using revenues derived from cryptocurrency to bolster its nuclear 
weapons program.
116
110. UN Sanctions: What They Are, How They Work, and Who Uses Them, U.N. NEWS
(May 4, 2016), https://news.un.org/en/story/2016/05/528382-un-sanctions-what-they-are-how-
they-work-and-who-uses-them.
111. Id.; U.N. Charter art. 27, ¶ 2.
112. UN Sanctions: What They Are, How They Work, and Who Uses Them, supra note 
110.
113. Adoption and Review Procedure for EU Sanctions, EUR. COUNCIL,
https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/policies/sanctions/adoption-review-procedure (last visited 
Oct. 9, 2020).
114. International bodies such as the European Union have similar vetting requirements 
regarding the institution of sanctions and are at least equally cognizant of sanctions’ propor-
tionality. See Sanctions: How and When the EU Adopts Restrictive Measures, EUR. COUNCIL,
https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/policies/sanctions (last visited Oct. 9, 2020). Of course, 
sanctions may also be imposed through the unilateral force of a single state. The proportion-
ality critique has more force in this second scenario. Conceding this, a strength of the interna-
tional framework proposed in Section IV is that it depends on the multilateral cooperation of 
states. Other states will feasibly be less willing to cooperate in investigations to enforce a 
sanction by which they feel a state has unilaterally violated the just war proportionality re-
quirement. Therefore, even though unilateral sanctions may be enforced under the framework 
outlined in Section IV, it will require the cooperation of other states through which the propor-
tionality of the sanctions in question may then be evaluated.
115. Mike Orcutt, This is How North Korea Uses Cutting-Edge Crypto Money Launder-
ing to Steal Millions, MIT TECH. REV. (Mar. 5, 2020), https://www.technologyreview.com
/s/615324/north-korean-hackers-cryptocurrency-money-laundering.
116. Id.
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Organizations like the United Nations and European Union have also 
placed broad prohibitions on transactions with people and companies.
117
Sanctions are imposed as a last resort and are typically used to address only 
the gravest international concerns.
118
The United Nations lists curtailing the 
efforts of extremist groups, ending “massive human rights violations,” and 
halting illegal smuggling as examples of sanctions’ legitimate uses.
119
To allow the use of cryptocurrency to go unchecked is to seriously un-
dermine the efficacy of financial sanctions. Perhaps the most alarming as-
pect is that the public is unaware of the scale of the problem. Due to the
pseudo-anonymity that many digital currencies afford their users, the public 
is often blind to the number of sanctioned countries, businesses, groups, and 
individuals who continuously bypass sanctions through cryptocurrency 
transactions.
120
The growing number of cryptocurrency users also contrib-
utes to the problem: the more accessible that cryptocurrency becomes 
throughout the world, the greater the access that those evading sanctions 
have to global financial markets.
121
Without the imposition of an internation-
al regulatory framework, these problems will only continue to propagate.
122
IV. A FRAMEWORK FOR THE INTERNATIONAL REGULATION OF 
CRYPTOCURRENCY
A formal international regulatory mechanism for cryptocurrencies 
would have numerous benefits, foremost among them limiting the evasion 
of international sanctions. An international regulatory mechanism would al-
so promote predictability in the regulation of cryptocurrencies. This would 
in turn entice institutional investors to build out the field of crypto users and 
117. Anahita Thoms, Cryptocurrencies and Sanctions, FIN. TIMES (Mar. 9, 2018), 
https://ftalphaville.ft.com/2018/03/09/2199186/guest-post-cryptocurrencies-and-sanctions; 
United Nations Security Council Consolidated List, U.N. S.C. (Oct. 31, 2020) 
https://scsanctions.un.org/fop/fop?xml=htdocs/resources/xml/en/consolidated.xml&xslt=
htdocs/resources/xsl/en/consolidated.xsl.
118. UN Sanctions: What They Are, How They Work, and Who Uses Them, supra note 
110.
119. Id.
120. See generally Andrew Bloom, Enforcing Sanctions in the Age of Cryptocurrency,
GBA GLOB. (June 27, 2019), https://www.gbaglobal.org/enforcing-sanctions-in-the-age-of-
cryptocurrency.
121. Ana Alexandre, FDD Assesses Risks of Crypto Use by Countries Under US Sanc-
tions, COINTELEGRAPH (July 11, 2019), https://cointelegraph.com/news/fdd-assesses-risks-of-
crypto-use-by-countries-under-us-sanctions.
122. Cf. YAYA J. FANUSIE & TREVOR LOGAN, CRYPTO ROGUES: U.S. STATE 
ADVERSARIES SEEKING BLOCKCHAIN SANCTIONS RESISTANCE (2019), https://www.fdd.org
/wp-content/uploads/2019/07/fdd-report-crypto-rogues.pdf (showcasing the varying arenas of 
difficulty among national crypto regulatory regimes in Venezuela, Russia, Iran, and China).
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encourage stability in an otherwise volatile marketplace.
123
Section IV.A de-
scribes the features required of an international regulatory framework for 
cryptocurrency. Section IV.B describes why an oft-proposed regulatory solu-
tion—the application of the IMF, WTO and CISG to cryptocurrencies—is 
an inadequate answer for an international regulatory framework. Section 
IV.C proposes a solution based on a multilateral treaty framework. This 
framework draws upon existing and effective regulatory mechanisms.
A.  Requirements of an International Regulatory Framework
The introduction of an international regulatory framework for crypto-
currency is hardly a novel idea. Commentators have debated its merits
124





or method of implementation.
127
This note adds to the existing 
body of literature by focusing on three perceived problems of the nation-by-
nation framework, each of which contributes to the evasion of international 
financial sanctions through cryptocurrency. The first deficiency stems from 
the current levels of pseudo-anonymity in cryptocurrency transactions.
128
The second problem is the patchwork framework which restricts coordina-
123. See generally Cumming et al., supra note 73, at 132 (“Recognizing the inability of 
enforcement within existing regulatory frameworks, we discuss the importance of regulation 
of the crypto asset class . . . in the establishment of an ecosystem that integrates investor pro-
tection and investments”); Kelly, supra note 76.
124. Compare Howden, supra note 51, at 745–56 (arguing that regulatory bodies must 
undertake the regulation of all cryptocurrencies), with Nabilou, supra note 51, at 272–90 (ar-
guing that cryptocurrencies such as bitcoin cannot be regulated in a centralized fashion be-
cause of their decentralized structure, and that regulation must occur at their code or protocol 
layer).
125. Compare Howden, supra note 51, at 746 (“Differing regulations across nations 
concerning cryptos are not necessarily problematic, and some countries may have valid rea-
sons for asserting more stringent regulations. However, an international forum must be pro-
vided so countries can work together in order to avoid the possible dangers that may face less 
economically developed nations and their interaction with the growing use and popularity of 
cryptos.”), with Nabilou, supra note 51, at 275 (arguing for “decentralized indirect regula-
tion”).
126. The Bank for International Settlements’ focuses regarding key regulatory issues 
(citing “moral suasion,” regulation of intermediaries, and the “interpretation of existing regu-
lations,” among other points) differs radically from those of the European Central Bank (citing 
“co-ordinated governmental efforts from national authorities” as key to any regulatory ap-
proach). ROSARIO GIRASA, REGULATION OF CRYPTOCURRENCIES & BLOCKCHAIN 
TECHNOLOGY: NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVES 199–201 (2018).
127. Compare Irina Cvetkova, Cryptocurrencies Legal Regulation, 5 BRICS L.J. 128, 
152 (2018) (arguing that only progressive jurisdictional and state regulation of cryptocurrency 
activity will allow for the implementation of legitimate and safe cryptocurrency relations),
with Andres Guadamuz & Chris Marsden, Blockchains and Bitcoin: Regulatory Responses to 
Cryptocurrencies, FIRST MONDAY (2015), https://firstmonday.org/article/view/6198/5163 (ar-
guing for five different proposals that might be effective in regulating cryptocurrency, none of 
which rely uniformly on state regulation).
128. See supra Section III.B.
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tion across nations and allows for unpredictable results across jurisdic-
tions.
129
The patchwork framework also permits offending actors to slip 
through the cracks and raises the spectre of double jeopardy when perpetra-
tors are identified and punished.130 The third and final deficiency is the ab-
sence of trustworthy third-party authorities with the power to examine the 
legitimacy of cryptocurrency transactions.
131
These three problems may be 
summarized respectively as anonymity, coordination, and oversight.
1.  Adjustments on the Spectrum of Pseudo-Anonymity
With these considerations in mind, a successful international regulatory 
framework of cryptocurrency should have two characteristics. First, it 
should provide governments with the identities of their nations’ cryptocur-
rency users.
132
This preserves a level of “pseudo-anonymity” whilst permit-
ting the implementation of regulatory functions:
133
users’ identities will re-
main anonymous to all but certain governmental actors. This is important as 
a frequent concern raised in response to the prospect of an international reg-
ulatory regime is the erasure of cryptocurrency users’ anonymity.
134
Regulations exposing aspects of a user’s identity should be viewed as a 
shift on the spectrum of anonymity instead of an obliteration of user ano-
nymity altogether. The recently implemented Know Your Customer 
(“KYC”) laws in the European Union demonstrates one way this shift might 
129. See supra Section III.A.
130. Id.
131. See supra Section III.B.
132. It’s worthwhile to acknowledge that should this solution be implemented in a cash-
less society, this would result in a society without entirely anonymous payments, even for be-
nign actors. The focus of this note, however, is the more realistic and immediate solution: the 
regulation of cryptocurrency in a world that is dependent on traditional payment forms with 
cryptocurrency being used as an alternative alongside. This has the advantage of taking into 
account the current payments landscape. As of publication, no country in the world is entirely 
dependent upon cryptocurrency payments, nor meaningfully close to being so. See Perez, su-
pra note 34. (detailing the countries that are close to becoming cashless societies—this is 
largely facilitated by the widespread use of credit and debit cards alongside the use of crypto-
currency. Notably, no country is close to becoming entirely dependent upon cryptocurren-
cies.).
133. Id.
134. Jerry Brito, China intends to launch a national digital currency that will let the 
government easily surveil spending. Following in their footsteps would be a mistake, COIN 
CENTER (Oct. 21, 2019), https://www.coincenter.org/china-intends-to-launch-a-national-
digital-currency-that-will-let-the-government-easily-surveil-spending-following-in-their-
footsteps-would-be-a-mistake/ (“Any . . . American-led effort [to regulate cryptocurrencies] 
must . . . mak[e] anonymity and censorship-resistance core network features.”); Rakesh Shar-
ma, What Does Government Regulation Mean for Privacy-Focused Cryptocurrencies?,
INVESTOPEDIA (June 25, 2019), https://www.investopedia.com/news/what-does-increased-
government-regulation-mean-privacyfocused-coins (quoting the CEO of Digital Dash, an open 
source alternative cryptocurrency: “Privacy is important for many practical reasons including 
user safety, so we believe it is an important aspect to incorporate into our solutions.”).
218 Michigan Journal of International Law [Vol. 42:199
be accomplished.
135
The cornerstone of KYC regulations is the requirement 
that European financial institutions duly identify and verify their clients’ 
identities.
136
This law has impacted cryptocurrency exchanges throughout 
Europe, each of whom are now required to peel back layers of anonymity to 
uncover their users’ identities.
137
The KYC laws do not unveil crypto users’ 
identities to the public at large.
138
Rather, users’ identities are mandatorily 
disclosed to a select sphere of institutional actors as identified in the KYC 
regulations.
139
This system remains encumbered by several of the deficien-
cies identified by this note: untrustworthy third-party intermediaries still act 
as gatekeepers to sensitive data
140
and the risk remains of double jeopardy 
violations between countries within and outside the European Union.
141
However, the KYC laws do illustrate that cryptocurrency regulations need 
not strip away users’ pseudo-anonymity altogether. Regulatory solutions can 
exist on the spectrum between complete anonymity and none at all.
142
2.  International Coordination
Second, the framework should be organized in a way that encourages 
coordination between states while remaining flexible enough to allow for 
individual state implementation and national oversight. This tenet borrows 
from organizations such as the International Civil Aviation Organization 
(“ICAO”), a specialized agency of the United Nations.
143
ICAO develops 
recommended aviation practices followed by signatories of the Convention 
on Civil Aviation (the “Chicago Convention”).
144
One such practice is the 
135. For an extensive discussion on Know Your Customer laws, see The Impact of Rising 
KYC & AML Regulations in Europe, KNOW YOUR CUSTOMER, https://knowyourcustomer.com
/impact-rising-kyc-aml-regulations-europe (last visited Oct. 11, 2020).
136. FEDOR POSKRIAKOV, MARIA CHIRIAEVA, & CHRISTOPHE CAVIN, Cryptocurrency 
Compliance and Risks: A European KYC/AML Perspective, in BLOCKCHAIN &
CRYPTOCURRENCY REGULATION (Josias N. Dewey ed., 2nd ed. 2020), https://www.global
legalinsights.com/practice-areas/blockchain-laws-and-regulations/11-cryptocurrency-co
mpliance-and-risks-a-european-kyc-aml-perspective.
137. See generally Craig Adeyanju, What Crypto Exchanges Do to Comply with KYC, 
AML and CFT Regulations, COINTELEGRAPH (May 17, 2019), https://cointelegraph.com
/news/what-crypto-exchanges-do-to-comply-with-kyc-aml-and-cft-regulations; Darren Kleine, 
Crypto Regulation is Coming to Europe: Are Exchanges Ready for New Rules?,




140. See supra Section III.B.
141. See supra Section III.A.
142. See infra Section IV.C.
143. See Convention on International Civil Aviation—Doc 7300, ICAO,
https://www.icao.int/publications/pages/doc7300.aspx (last visited Oct. 11, 2020).
144. See generally Convention on International Civil Aviation, supra note 46.
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Traveller Identification Programme (“TRIP”).
145
The objective of TRIP is for 
all U.N. Member States to have the ability to “uniquely identify individu-
als.”
146
To facilitate the TRIP objective, the ICAO issues recommendations 
that help nations develop repositories to hold credible evidence of identifica-
tion.
147
Additionally, the ICAO facilitates the creation of globally interoper-
able protocols which link passports to their holders.
148
The program outlined 
in TRIP affords nations autonomy and flexibility in meeting these goals.
149
Crucially, the TRIP program simultaneously maintains a global network in 
which passports—and thereby individuals—can be identified at any interna-
tional juncture.
150
The multilateral nature of ICAO allows for flexibility and the continu-
ous development of travel protocols.
151
This is also a desirable asset for the 
regulation of cryptocurrency. Cryptocurrencies are a fast-developing mar-
ket
152
which national governments do not yet fully understand.
153
The ability 
to review and revise the international regulatory structure is paramount to 
leave room for improvements and ensure that any regulatory framework 
does not become stale.
154
145. Traveller Identification Programme, ICAO, https://www.icao.int/Security/FAL




149. For example, TRIP permits nations flexibility in the identifying information held in 
each national passport database. Some nations such as Argentina maintain biometric data ac-
cessible by a wide variety of Argentinian governmental agencies; others, such as Canada, are 
in the process of eliminating the development of centralized databases containing biometric 
information. Biometric Data Retention for Passport Applicants and Holders, L. LIBR. CONG.
(Mar. 2014), https://www.loc.gov/law/help/biometric-data-retention/biometric-passport-data-
retention.pdf [hereinafter Biometric Data Retention]. TRIP also provides recommendations for 
Machine Readable Travel Documents (“MRTD” or passports) which allows for flexibility in 
their form and substance. See Machine Readable Travel Documents (Doc 9303), ICAO (7th ed. 
2015), https://www.icao.int/publications/Documents/9303_p3_cons_en.pdf.
150. Traveller Identification Programme, supra note 145.
151. For example, ICAO has recently begun to engage with the United Nations’ sustain-
able development goals (“SDGs”) and has linked its strategic objectives to these goals. It con-
tinuously monitors the effects of these goals and develops its framework as appropriate. Avia-
tion Development, ICAO, https://www.icao.int/about-icao/aviation-development/Pages
/default.aspx (last visited Oct. 11, 2020); ICAO and the United Nations Sustainable Develop-
ment Goals, ICAO, https://www.icao.int/about-icao/aviation-development/pages/sdg.aspx (last 
visited Oct. 11, 2020).
152. Over 2000 cryptocurrencies are currently available for purchase and this number is 
growing. See Reiff, supra note 12.
153. The mechanisms underlying cryptocurrencies are frequently posited to be shrouded 
in an aura of mystery and branded as “hard, even [for] smart people.” See Michael Arrington, 
It Will Take Years for Smart People to Understand Cryptocurrencies, NAKAMOTO
(Jan. 3, 2020), https://nakamoto.com/it-will-take-years-for-smart-people-to-understand-
cryptocurrencies.
154. Massad, supra note 96, at 42.
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B. Past Proposals for the International Regulation of Cryptocurrency
One proposal that frequently surfaces within the literature on crypto 
regulation repurposes provisions within current international regulatory bod-
ies to police digital assets. The World Trade Organization (“WTO”),
155
the 
International Monetary Fund (“IMF”),
156
and the Convention on the Interna-
tional Sale of Goods (“CISG”)
157
have each been cited as different regulato-
ry possibilities to control for the use and abuse of cryptocurrencies. These 
organizations assert control by classifying cryptocurrencies in ways that 
force conformity with the international organizations’ slates of regulatory 
measures.
These proposals have the advantage of working within international 






each have 164, 
189, and 84 participating countries, respectively. Moreover, provisions exist 
within each organization or regime that could conceivably be applicable to 
cryptocurrencies. For example, cryptocurrencies could arguably constitute a 
sale of a good under the CISG.
161
If classified as such, the exchange of cryp-
tocurrencies would be regulated in every contract of sale made under the 
CISG.
162
This would have implications for issues such as the breach of 
cross-border cryptocurrency contracts, the mitigation of damages in failed 
transactions, and responsibility for the substitution of subpar goods pur-
chased with crypto coins.
163
Indeed, one commentator dubbed the applicabil-
155. Howden, supra note 51, at 780.
156. Wolfie Zhao, IMF Chief Lagarde: Global Cryptocurrency Regulation is ‘Inevita-
ble,’ COINDESK (Feb. 12, 2018), https://www.coindesk.com/imf-chief-lagarde-global-
cryptocurrency-regulation-is-inevitable.
157. Sebastian Omlor, The CISG and Libra: A Monetary Revolution for International 
Commercial Transactions?, STANFORD J. BLOCKCHAIN L. & POL’Y 83, 94 (2020).
158. WTO: Members and Observers, WORLD TRADE ORG. [“WTO”],
https://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/org6_e.htm (last visited Oct. 11, 2020).
159. List of Members, INT’L MONETARY FUND [“IMF”] (Apr. 15, 2020), 
https://www.imf.org/external/np/sec/memdir/memdate.htm.
160. CISG: Table of Contracting States, CISG (Jan. 8, 2016), 
https://www.cisg.law.pace.edu/cisg/countries/cntries.html.
161. Although the convention does not explicitly define “goods,”neither is the definition 
derived from domestic law. Instead, the definition of what constitutes a good is “subject to the 
autonomous interpretation of the CISG in its international character.” See Omlor, supra note 
157, at 87. See also COMMENTARY ON THE UN CONVENTION ON THE INTERNATIONAL SALE 
OF GOODS (CISG) Art. 1 para. 16 (Ingeborg Schwenzer & Peter Schlechtriem eds., 2nd ed. 
2005); FRANCO FERRARI & MARCO TORSELLO, INTERNATIONAL SALES LAW—CISG IN A 
NUTSHELL 95 (1st ed. 2014).
162. Koji Takahashi, Applicability of CISG, BLOCKCHAIN, CRYPTOCURRENCY, CRYPTO-
ASSET & L. (Nov. 2, 2015), http://cryptocurrencylaw.blogspot.com/2015/11/applicability-of-
cisg.html.
163. Albert H. Krtizer, General Principles of the CISG, PACE L. SCH. INST. OF INT’L
COM. L. (Sept. 7, 1999), https://www.cisg.law.pace.edu/cisg/text/principles7.html.
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ity of the CISG to cryptocurrencies as nothing short of a “monetary revolu-
tion.”
164
Alternatively, the argument that regulation should take place under the 
WTO suggests that cryptocurrencies should be classified as a good that may 
be traded between nations.
165
If classified as such, cryptocurrencies would 
become subject to various restrictive trading provisions of the WTO.
166
One 
such provision is Most-Favored-Nation clause: With certain exceptions, this 
clause requires that all nations treat each other equally in trade.
167
Under this 
interpretation, a country could choose to regulate digital assets by banning 
cryptocurrency “imports” into their domestic market entirely.
168
The WTO’s classification of cryptocurrency as a good could also lead to 
IMF oversight.
169
To classify cryptocurrency as a good would catalyze the 
IMF’s jurisdiction over exchange controls relating to the payment and trans-
fer of cryptocurrencies.
170
This would also give the IMF discretion over 
cryptocurrency exchange rate restrictions, although how this might work in 
practice is anyone’s guess.
171
Each of these approaches has distinct benefits.
172
However, the various 
weaknesses apply across the board. The first fundamental weakness of the 
aforementioned approaches is that each regulatory mechanism suffers from 
a structural disadvantage. The IMF, WTO and CISG each require the classi-
fication of cryptocurrency as a good.
173
The merits of this classification have 
been oft-debated,
174
but the fact remains that cryptocurrency is unlike any 
commodity, service or currency that international organizations regulate. In 
each instance, this translates into a structural weakness. To illustrate: the 
164. Omlor, supra note 157, at 83.
165. Howden, supra note 51, at 783.
166. Id. at 784.
167. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade art. I, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A—11, 55 
U.N.T.S. 194 [hereinafter GATT].
168. Howden, supra note 51, at 784; Omlor, supra note 157.
169. Id.
170. Deborah Siegel, Legal Aspects of the IMF/WTO Relationship: The Fund’s Articles 
of Agreement and the WTO Agreements, 96 AM. J. INT’L L. 561, 563 (2002).
171. Exchange restrictions are typically tied to state-centric factors such as private and 
public debt, trade, and monetary reserves. Howden, supra note 51, at 771. Because cryptocur-
rencies are not tied to a single state it is unclear how the IMF might enforce or restrict an ex-
change rate on digital assets.
172. See, e.g., Howden, supra note 51, at 770—93.
173. Id. at 783; Omlor, supra note 157, at 87—88.
174. See, e.g., Jake Ryan, Crypto Classification: Security vs. Commodity, HACKER 
NOON (Aug. 2, 2018), https://hackernoon.com/crypto-classification-security-vs-commodity-
decf2d78c4a1; see also Cryptocurrency: The Top Things You Need to Know, BDO (Jan. 2019), 
https://www.bdo.com/getattachment/9a49abf0-c90a-453c-81ef-
e50f758e136a/attachment.aspx?Cryptocurrency-The-Top-Things-You-Need-To-Know-(1).pdf.
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CISG is not equipped for the extreme volatility of cryptocurrencies.
175
The 
IMF would have immense difficulty enforcing an exchange rate on digital 
assets untethered to any state.
176
The WTO would need to devise a way to 
determine the cryptocurrency’s country of origin to make for effective regu-
lation (a standard that is already unclear without the added layer of crypto-
currency).
177
No doubt there are short-term fixes to each of these prob-
lems,
178
but they amount to mere band-aids on enormous structural deficits 
that cannot be solved by mere language tweaks or newly applied methods of 
textual interpretation.
The second fundamental weakness of using pre-existing conventions to 
regulate cryptocurrencies is that the conventions’ terms do not address the 
heart of the problem. Each of these organizations was designed to eliminate 
specific regulatory dilemmas that existed well before the development of 
cryptocurrency.
179





volatility in their 
worth
182
—are not included within these conventions and will remain un-
addressed should the international community resort to regulation through 
any of these pre-existing organizations.
C.  International Regulation: A New, Multilateral Treaty
The creation of a new multilateral treaty is the most realistic way to im-
plement international regulatory standards on the use of cryptocurrency. It is 
also the most effective method of preventing the evasion of financial sanc-
175. Miklós Király, The Vienna Convention on International Sales of Goods and the 
Bitcoin, U.S.—CHINA L. REV. 182 (2019) (“The crux [of the problem] is that the CISG re-
fers . . . to the price charged at the time of the conclusion of the contract, while the dramatic
change in Bitcoin’s value might have happened just after it.”).
176. Exchange restrictions imposed by the IMF are typically tied to state-centric factors 
such as private and public debt, trade, and monetary reserves. See Howden, supra note 51, at 
771.
177. Id. at 788.
178. For example, Howden proposes a solution to the WTO “place of origin” dilemma: 
“A simple measure to determine a crypto’s country of origin would be to identify the origin 
country as that country from which the crypto was last sent.” Id.
179. Indeed, the WTO was designed with the goal of liberalizing trade, an objective that 
some might characterize as somewhat antithetical to the goals of regulation. See id. at 781. 
The CISG was designed to unify commercial law and alleviate obstacles to international trade. 
Harry M. Flechtner, The United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of 
Goods, U.N. AUDIOVISUAL LIBR. INT’L L. (2009), https://legal.un.org/avl/ha/ccisg/ccisg.html. 
The IMF served “to overcome the collective action problem of allowing individual countries 
to enact self-interested economic policies without jeopardizing the global economy.” Nicholas 
A. Plassaras, Regulating Digital Currencies: Bringing Bitcoin Within the Reach of the IMF, 14 
CHI. J. INT’L L. 377, 390–91 (2013).
180. See supra Section III.B.
181. See id.
182. See supra Section III.A.
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tions through the use of digital currencies.
183
This is because a new multilat-
eral treaty can be structured to address challenges unique to the regulation 
of cryptocurrency from the outset.
184
The following proposal goes beyond standard legal justifications for a 
multilateral mechanism. It drills down into the substantive mechanisms that 
an effective treaty must include. The levels of specificity to this end are per-
haps uncommon in a typical legal analysis. At first, this might even seem 
beyond the scope of a legal proposal. However, this analysis is essential to 
explain why a new, multilateral treaty is required. The current structures in 
place could not begin to grapple with the complex underlying issues which 
are so crucial to the regulation of cryptocurrency. As such, the substantive 
components of the proposed treaty undergird the very reason why a new 
multilateral treaty is necessary.
1.  Public Key Cryptography
The proposed multilateral framework should consist of three equally
important dimensions. The first dimension implicates the technology which 
underlies all cryptocurrencies: public key cryptography.
185
Public key cryp-
tography is the crux of cryptocurrency users’ pseudo-anonymity.
186
It is also 
a fundamental way in which cryptocurrencies may themselves be regulat-
ed.
187
The identification of cryptocurrency users is important because it is 
the gateway to additional, future regulation. States cannot regulate users 
who cannot be identified.
188
Deanonymizing users also has intrinsic value: If 
countries can identify the users conducting cryptocurrency transactions, they 
will be better able to identify those users, governments, or agents that defy 
international financial sanctions.
To accomplish these objectives, the new international regulatory frame-
work should require the establishment of national databases of public keys 
linked to personal identifying information. If public keys are identified with-
in a central national system, each cryptocurrency transaction may be traced 
183. See supra Section III.C.
184. This is in contrast to the WTO, CISG, and IMF which were all created for varied 
and distinguishable challenges that cryptocurrency either does not face or that are tangential to 
the real issues at hand. See Király, supra note 175.
185. Public and Private Keys, supra note 26.
186. Id.
187. See, e.g., Dan Ryan, FinCEN: Know Your Customer Requirements, HARVARD L.
SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE (Feb. 7, 2016), https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2016/02/07
/fincen-know-your-customer-requirements (outlining the Know Your Customer requirements, 
created to “help financial institutions avoid illicit transactions”).
188. See Elizabeth Rosenberg & Neil Bhatiya, Busting North Korea’s Sanctions Evasion,
CTR. FOR A NEW AM. SEC. (Mar. 4, 2020), https://www.cnas.org/publications/commentary
/busting-north-koreas-sanctions-evasion (documenting strategies to undercut North Korean 
financing of proliferation, the authors recommend a “culture of collaboration to identify and
halt the money trail for the nuclear threats emanating from North Korea” [emphasis added]).
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to its source by that nation’s government.
189
Similar to KYC regulations, this 
framework decreases anonymity of cryptocurrency users by revealing their 
identities to a central database.
190
However, a level of pseudo-anonymity 
does remain intact: The identities of cryptocurrency users would be anony-
mous to all non-governmental users without access to this central database. 
Simply put, a central database of public keys is similar to a central database 
of bank account numbers, yet without the problematic risks: Unlike bank 
account numbers,
191
public keys are intended to be made public.
192
There is 
no risk of fraud or unauthorized withdrawals from a user’s digital wallet as a 
bad actor cannot access these funds without the user’s corresponding private 
key.
193
This framework draws upon the ICAO structure for the storage of pass-
port information.
194
Under ICAO, each participating country maintains a na-
tional database of passport numbers and corresponding identifying infor-
mation.
195
Similar to ICAO’s passport database requirements,
196
the 
cryptocurrency treaty should require states to maintain certain standards of 
public key identification while allowing for flexibility regarding methods of 
implementation. This eliminates a problem that frequently vexes multilateral 
treaties: unwieldy rules that large groups of states can rarely agree upon.
197
2.  International Public Key Directory
Public key identification within a national database is helpful for dis-
crete states. However, by itself it does little to aid in international regulation. 
To be fully effective, the multilateral framework must also include a mecha-
nism that enables cross-border information-sharing. Again, ICAO provides a 
189. See Surveillance Defense, supra note 29.
190. See supra Section IV.A.
191. See What Can Someone Do With Your Bank Account Number?, BANKS (Oct. 16, 
2018), https://banks.org/what-can-someone-do-with-your-bank-account-number.
192. See Jake Frankenfield, Public Key, INVESTOPEDIA (July 30, 2018), 
https://www.investopedia.com/terms/p/public-key.asp.
193. Id.
194. See Traveller Identification Programme, supra note 145.
195. Some states such as Argentina, Mexico, and the United States have opted to use 
biometric identification such as fingerprints and photographs to identify travelers, while coun-
tries such as Japan use databases that store application forms for passports without the bio-
metric data of all passport applicants. See, e.g., Biometric Data Retention, supra note 149.
196. Narjess Abdennebi, ICAO Traveller Identification Programme (TRIP) Strategy,
ICAO SKY TALKS WORKSHOPS 18—19 (2016), https://www.icao.int/Meetings/a39/workshops
/Documents/A39%20Workshops%20-%20TRIP%20Strategy.pdf.
197. See Bilateral or Multilateral: Which Trade Partnerships Work Best?,
KNOWLEDGE@WHARTON (Apr. 27, 2017), https://knowledge.wharton.upenn.edu/article
/bilateral-multilateral-trade-partnerships-work-best.
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useful blueprint. ICAO maintains a Public Key Directory (“PKD”)
198
which 
functions as a central repository of cryptographic public keys.
199
This allows 
for the exchange of information required to authenticate the digital signa-
tures of ePassports.
200
Notably, the ICAO PKD does not contain any person-
al information about the passport holder.
201
This public key information is 
available to all participating countries.
202
Similarly, a cryptocurrency PKD should be established which shares the 
national origin of each public key without further identifying data. This 
would allow states to crack down on the evasion of international sanctions
without compromising the personal information of cryptocurrency users. 
Further, should states wish to open an investigation, the PKD would act as a 
springboard from which further negotiations could ensue between countries. 
ICAO acts as a collaborative fulcrum around which states work to reach 
their objectives in civil aviation and international security;
203
the cryptocur-
rency treaty would do the same to prevent digital currency transactions that 
evade financial sanctions.
An alternative proposition to a multilateral PKD is the enactment of bi-
lateral treaties which enable the exchange of public key information.
204
However, the downsides of this proposal are numerous. Not only would this 
mechanism prove exponentially more expensive,
205
but the coordination ef-
forts would prove inordinately cumbersome.
206
To illustrate, if eight states 
wished to conduct exchanges of public key information using bilateral trea-
198. For a detailed explanation on the technical underbelly of the ICAO PKD, see
MARKUS HARTMANN, STEPHAN KÖRTING, & OLGA KÄTHLER, A PRIMER ON THE ICAO
PUBLIC KEY DIRECTORY (2009), http://www.securitydocumentworld.com/creo_files/upload
/client_files/hjp_pkd_promotion-paper_v1_5_20090520.pdf.
199. Public Key Directory, ICAO, https://www.icao.int/Security/FAL/PKD/Pages
/default.aspx (last visited Oct. 11, 2020).
200. Id.; Christiane DerMarkar, ICAO Public Key Directory – State of Progress, ICAO 2 
(2019), https://www.icao.int/Meetings/TRIP-Symposium-2019/PublishingImages/Pages
/Presentations/ICAO%20Public%20Key%20Directory(PKD)-State%20of%20Progress.pdf.
201. The public key information only serves to confirm that “the ePassport has been is-
sued by a bona fide authority and that it has not been tampered with. ePassports: Digital Sig-
natures and the Public Key Directory, GOV’T CAN. (May 13, 2014), https://www.canada.ca
/en/news/archive/2014/05/epassports-digital-signatures-public-key-directory.html.
202. Id. See also ICAO PKD Participants, ICAO, https://www.icao.int/Security
/FAL/PKD/Pages/ICAO-PKDParticipants.aspx (last visited Oct. 11, 2020).
203. Cooperation Delivers Enhanced ICAO Compliance and Sustainable Aviation De-
velopment, ICAO (Aug. 1, 2019), https://www.icao.int/Newsroom/Pages/Cooperation-
delivers-enhanced-ICAO-compliance-and-sustainable-aviation-development.aspx.
204. See Roman Vanek, ICAO Public Key Directory, KEESING PLATFORM (June 1, 
2013), https://platform.keesingtechnologies.com/icao-public-key-directory.
205. Id.
206. Christine DerMarkar, ICAO Public Key Directory (PKD), ICAO SKY TALKS 
WORKSHOPS 6 (2016), https://www.icao.int/Meetings/a39/workshops/Documents/A39%20
Workshop%20-%20PKD.pdf.
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ties, this would require fifty-six information exchanges.
207
Under the PKD, 
only two exchanges of information are required—one from each country to 
the central repository.
208
If 191 states wished to conduct exchanges of infor-
mation, 36,290 bilateral exchanges of information would be necessary.
209
Under the PKD, the number of exchanges remains at two.
210
A multilateral 
treaty establishing a PKD is an elegant solution that avoids encumbering the 
regulation of cryptocurrencies with bureaucratic red tape.
3.  Prosecution Guidelines & Foreign Fine Credits
The third aspect of the proposed multilateral cryptocurrency treaty is 
the inclusion of prosecution guidelines
211
and the establishment of a mecha-
nism permitting foreign fine credits.
212
This will further cement the norm of 
international cooperation between states—both in investigations and prose-
cutions—and will leave oversight in the hands of governmental actors in-
stead of self-interested third-party intermediaries.
213
The inclusion of a commitment to prosecution guidelines within the 
multilateral treaty is an important step toward preventing instances of dou-
ble jeopardy.
214
The evasion of financial sanctions is a cross-border endeav-
or, and the use of cryptocurrencies to do so has the potential to implicate 
countless jurisdictions.
215





211. See, e.g., Guidelines for Deciding ‘Which Jurisdiction Should Prosecute?,’
EUROJUST (2016), https://www.anti-corruption.com/files/2018/08/30/2016_jurisdiction-
guidelines_en.pdf [hereinafter Eurojust Guidelines].
212. Foreign fine credits are a tool that government enforcers typically use to prevent 
double jeopardy issues in multinational settlements. They are repurposed here to provide relief 
not only for multinational corporations, but individuals and small businesses that may also 
find themselves subject to violations of double jeopardy. See Megan Zwiebel, Is the Pie Get-
ting Bigger? Double Jeopardy in the Age of International Cooperation, ANTI-CORRUPTION 
REP. (Sept. 5, 2018), https://www.anti-corruption.com/2619506/is-the-pie-getting-bigger-
double-jeopardy-in-the-age-of-international-cooperation.thtml.
213. See supra Section III.B.
214. Double jeopardy (or non bis in idem) is defined as “[t]he fact of being prosecuted or 
sentenced twice for substantially the same offense.” Double Jeopardy, BLACK’S LAW 
DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014).
215. The technology underlying the use of cryptocurrency and blockchain allows for the 
possibility of transactions touching computer servers (“nodes”) all over the world before their 
completion. Under the legal principle of jurisdiction loci, this allows any number of nations to 
assert jurisdiction over an illicit transaction should it touch one of their computer servers—the 
physical territory that an entity’s authority covers—in passing. See Spatial Jurisdiction,
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11
th
ed. 2019); Jaak Poldma, Dragged to the U.S. Courts (Part 1): 
Jurisdiction & the Location of Blockchain Nodes, ORRICK (Nov. 28, 2018), 
https://blogs.orrick.com/blockchain/dragged-to-the-u-s-courts-part-1-jurisdiction-and-the-
location-of-blockchain-nodes.
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double jeopardy for the same alleged crimes, prosecution guidelines should 
be used to ensure a just outcome. The Eurojust guidelines are an excellent 
starting point.
216
These guidelines place an emphasis on factors that might be 
considered in a multi-jurisdictional case, including the protection of wit-
nesses; the costs and resources which will be allocated to the investigation; 
and the location of suspects.
217
In determining jurisdiction over the evasion of financial sanctions, some 
factors may prove more helpful than others. Territoriality is one such fac-
tor.
218
Under the Eurojust guidelines, a presumption is made that the prose-
cution will take place in the jurisdiction in which the majority of the crimi-
nal action occurred.
219
As applied to the evasion of financial sanctions, if a 
North Korean actor buys goods from a Japanese vendor using cryptocurren-
cy, Japan has presumptive jurisdiction. This should remain the case even if 
the transaction was communicated across hundreds of different servers the 
world over; the most important aspect of the crime—the unlawful purchase 
of goods—took place in Japan.
220
A second mechanism to prevent violations of double jeopardy is the in-
stitution of foreign fine credits.
221
Foreign fine credits are a method used in 
contemporaneous, multi-jurisdictional investigations.
222
To the extent that 
disgorgement or restitution is imposed during the course of one nation’s in-
vestigations, another would give “dollar-for-dollar credit” for fines in con-
nection with related actions.
223
This has the effect of reducing duplicative 
payments, or “piling on.”
224
In the cryptocurrency treaty, this should be in-
corporated as a failsafe mechanism should the prosecution guidelines fail to 
prevent multiple investigations for the same criminal action. Foreign fine 
credits ensure that if multiple jurisdictions prosecute a single actor, that ac-
tor’s cooperation with and payment to all authorities is credited.
225
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In sum, the dual mechanisms proposed within the multilateral treaty 
prioritize cross-border cooperation and altering the levels of pseudo-
anonymity to which cryptocurrency users are entitled.
226
The framework will 
require international buy-in and no doubt will take both time and trial-and-
error to implement. However, a new multilateral framework remains the best 
option for the regulation of cryptocurrency. Digital currencies are unlike any 
technology currently regulated by the international system. To rely on op-
tions such as the WTO, CISG or IMF to provide effective regulatory mecha-
nisms is tantamount to fitting a circle into a square. A new regulatory regime 
may be tailored from its beginning to the unique properties of cryptocurren-
cies that allow for the evasion of international sanctions. With this goal in 
mind from the outset, an effective framework might be built which allows 
the world to use and benefit from cryptocurrencies to their full extent.
V. CONCLUSION
Cryptocurrencies began as a niche technology in 2009.
227
A mere decade 
later, cryptocurrencies are firmly entrenched within our global financial sys-
tem.
228
Their benefits are numerous. It is hard to overstate the impact that 
cryptocurrencies may have on emerging economies.
229
Transactions using 
cryptocurrency can prove easier and faster than those conducted through 
banks,
230
and transaction fees are usually nonexistent.
231
The risk of identity 
theft is much lower than when using traditional lines of payment such as 
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credit cards.
232
Finally, cryptocurrencies are the great equalizer: If you have 
access to the internet, you have access to cryptocurrency.
233
Along with cryptocurrencies’ benefits, however, comes a host of issues. 
Many stem from the pseudo-anonymity afforded to users and the dearth of 
international regulatory cooperation.
234
Without an international regulatory 
framework, sanctioned actors may conduct international transactions with 
impunity.
235
Functionally, this permits terrorists, unstable governmental re-
gimes, and extremist groups access to funds from which they would other-
wise be deprived.
236
This is untenable in a global financial system growing at 
an exponential pace.
237
An international regulatory framework for cryptocurrency is therefore 
vital. The only viable framework is through the enactment of a new, multi-
lateral treaty with distinct features applicable only to cryptocurrencies. The 
dual components of an international public key directory and mechanisms 
which underscore international cooperation are essential to preventing the 
evasion of financial sanctions. Moreover, a new multilateral treaty can pro-
vide a gateway to future regulatory efforts that address different aspects of 
cryptocurrency regulation. Preventing financial sanctions solves only a 
small component of the challenges that cryptocurrencies present. Nonethe-
less, the solution presented in this note is a crucial step in the right direction. 
Perhaps most importantly, it may provide a blueprint for future regulations 
yet to come.
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